Abstract: Location privacy has been a serious concern for mobile users who use location-based services provided by third-party providers via mobile networks. Recently, there have been tremendous efforts on developing new anonymity or obfuscation techniques to protect location privacy of mobile users. Though effective in certain scenarios, these existing techniques usually assume that a user has a constant privacy requirement along spatial and/or temporal dimensions, which may be not true in real-life scenarios. In this paper, we introduce a new location privacy problem: Location-aware Location Privacy Protection (L2P2) problem, where users can define dynamic and diverse privacy requirements for different locations. The goal of the L2P2 problem is to find the smallest cloaking area for each location request so that diverse privacy requirements over spatial and/or temporal dimensions are satisfied for each user. In this paper, we formalize two versions of the L2P2 problem, and propose several efficient heuristics to provide such location-aware location privacy protection for mobile users. Through extensive simulations over large synthetic and real-life datasets, we confirm the effectiveness and efficiency of the proposed L2P2 algorithms.
Introduction
In recent years, extensive media reports about modern smart phones (i.e., Android phones and iPhones) being able to store and gather users' location data have attracted national attention, and even the lawmakers from the congress expressed their concerns [1] . The privacy concerns from mobile users on location data have significant impact on usage and development of Location-Based Service (LBS) applications and mobile systems.
LBS is a type of service where the information is provided based on a mobile user's geographical location. Now, mobile devices with positioning capabilities (such as smart phones, watches, bracelet, and tablets) have been extensively used in our daily lives. These devices and various mobile apps provide great convenience to millions of users via LBS, such as discovering the nearest banking cash machine, performing location-based mobile sensing [2] , receiving coupons from near-by shops, or identifying human activities [3] . In addition, with exchanging location information with other devices or service providers, location-based networking protocols can further improve communication efficiency [4] [5] [6] . However, privacy issues have been a big concern when location data has to leave local devices to a third-party for LBS. The broadcast nature of wireless networks usually makes it challenging to protect a user's privacy including identities and locations. Location data is sensitive since it can reveal where you live and work, where you go for movies, dinner, and vacation, and even if you stay at someone else's house. As defined by Beresford and Stajano in Ref. [7] , location privacy is "the ability to prevent other parties from learning one's current or past location". In an example scenario of LBS application, a mobile user may issue an LBS query "where is the closest Bank of America branch?". From privacy protection perspective, this user may not want to disclose his identity, nor his exact location information, especially when the service is sensitive, but he still wants to get the query resolved by LBS providers. Therefore, location privacy has been a great challenge for location-based services in mobile environment.
Over the past few years, many different approaches have been proposed to protect a user's location privacy, for example, Gruteser and Grunwald's k-anonymity based approach [8] , where a cloaking area in which at least k users are present is provided, and Xu and Cai's entropy-based approach [9] , where a cloaking area is decided based on multiple users' footprints in the area. Generally speaking, the approaches to protecting location privacy can be roughly divided into four categories: (1) regulatory approaches, (2) privacy policy based approaches, (3) anonymitybased approaches, and (4) obfuscation-based approaches. Anonymity-based approaches separate users' identities from their location information, e.g., a user's identity may be replaced with pseudonyms [7] . Obfuscation-based approaches downgrade the quality of users' location information to protect location privacy, e.g., a cloaking area (instead of the user's exact location) may be reported based on multiple users' footprints in the region [9] . In this paper, we focus on designing cloaking area based approaches.
Though effective in certain scenarios, most of these existing techniques usually assume that a user has a constant privacy requirement, which may be not true in certain real-life scenarios. In real world, different locations or different types of LBS requests may reveal different private information of the mobile user, thus the user may have diverse privacy requirements over various locations and/or with the change of date and time. For example, in the spatial dimension, a user may have higher privacy requirement when she/he is in a hospital compared with the case when she/he is in a shopping mall; and in the temporal dimension, a user may have higher privacy requirement in a workday morning compared with the case in a weekend afternoon due to the specialty of her/his job. From these, we can see that addressing a user's diverse and dynamic privacy requirements which may depend on the time and location information would be necessary for location privacy protection in mobile location-based services.
In this paper, we introduce and investigate a new location privacy problem: Location-aware Location Privacy Protection (L2P2) problem, which addresses the dynamic and diverse privacy requirements from mobile users. We assume that a mobile user can have diverse and dynamic location privacy requirements, depending on where or when the user requests a location-based service. Each LBS request is associated with a specific privacy requirement, and we generate a cloaking area to fulfill this requirement. Notice that privacy requirements can be expressed through either kanonymity or entropy based metrics, and our approach can accommodate both. To be more specific, for kanonymity based metric, if the privacy requirement is k, the cloaking area should have at least k users including the user makes the request; for entropy-based metric, the footprint frequencies from multiple users in the cloaking area can be used to compute a privacy value, and this value should be no less than the requirement. We will give the formal definitions for both metrics in Section 3.
Considering that mobile users can have a sequence of LBS requests to make the scenarios more complicated, to tackle this, we further define two versions of L2P2 problems: basic L2P2 and enhanced L2P2. In basic L2P2, each user request can be seen as an independent event. To generate a cloaking area, all users in the area are considered during the calculation of privacy values, and the privacy value provided by the cloaking area should be equal to or larger than the requirement. We provide a simple cloaking area generation algorithm to find the minimum-sized cloaking areas. In enhanced L2P2, since a sequence of LBS requests will generate a sequence of cloaking areas, we choose a conservative approach in favor of privacy protection. To be more specific, we enforce a much stronger restriction, where only the common users among this sequence of cloaking areas are considered for computing privacy values. This restriction comes from the possibility that an attacker may be able to shorten the list of possible users through discovering the common users in a sequence of cloaking areas. Existing cloaking methods do not work for this problem, since the privacy values of the sequence of cloaking areas are not independent any more. To address this enhanced L2P2 problem, we propose four different heuristics to generate the cloaking areas in polynomial time. All proposed algorithms can provide diverse privacy protection for multiple users over both temporal and spatial domains to fulfill the mobile scenarios. In addition, in order to evaluate our approach, we also conduct extensive simulations over large sets of mobile user location data (both synthetic data generated by a networkbased traffic generator [10] for Oldenberg, Germany and real-life GPS traces of thousands of taxis in Beijing, China [11, 12] ). Results show that our methods can fulfill diverse privacy requirements with slight downgrade of the quality of original location data.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related work on location privacy. Section 3 introduces the model and assumptions used in our study, and the newly defined location-aware location privacy protection problem. To address this problem, Section 4 presents a set of algorithms. Section 5 shows our simulation results and Section 6 concludes the paper. A preliminary version of this paper was appeared in Ref. [13] .
Related Work
To protect location privacy, many approaches have been proposed [7] [8] [9] [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] [20] [21] [22] . According to Ref. [23] , these approaches can be divided into four categories: (1) regulatory approaches, (2) privacy policy based approaches, (3) anonymity-based approaches, and (4) obfuscation-based approaches, where regulatory approaches are those related to making rules, regulations, and legislations to protect privacy, privacy policies are those mechanisms that can prohibit certain misuse of location data, anonymity-based approaches separate users' identities from their location information, and obfuscation-based approaches downgrade the quality of users' location information. In this section, we follow this classification and give an overview of the approaches in the last two categories.
Anonymity-based approaches
Beresford and Stajano [7] proposed a framework of frequently changing a user's identities through pseudonyms. Moreover, the concept of mix zones in anonymous communication has also been applied to provide location privacy. To measure the location privacy, two metrics, where one is based on entropy and the other is based on anonymity sets, are also proposed in Ref. [7] . Gruteser and Grunwald [8] proposed a method using the concept of k-anonymous, in which a user's location is reported as a two-dimensional spatial cloaking area where at least k 1 other users are also in the same area. A quadtree-based cloaking algorithm has been designed, and the size of the anonymity set k is used to measure the degree of anonymity. In Bettini et al.'s approach [14] , location-based quasi-identifiers are defined, and based on the concept of historical kanonymity, a formal framework has been proposed to see the potential risk of location information leading to the identity disclose. In Kido et al.'s approach [15] , dummy location data has been generated and mixed with real location data, so that it is difficult for the location-based service providers to differentiate them.
Obfuscation-based approaches
In a feeling-based approach proposed by Xu and Cai [9] , a user's privacy requirement is defined through specifying a public region (e.g., a restaurant), and the public region's popularity is computed through an entropy-based approach regarding the region's users (i.e., visitors) and footprints. A user's location may be disclosed in the form of a cloaking box, only if the disclosed cloaking box's popularity is equal to or greater than that of the pre-specified public region. Xu and Cai [9] further proposed the concept of PPopular Trajectory, which is related to the temporal and spatial aspects of a mobile (moving) user, and proposed quadtree-based algorithms to select cloaking sets and compute cloaking boxes. In this approach, an entropybased metric has been proposed to measure the location privacy. In another approach [16] , a formal obfuscation model (with weighted graph) is presented, and a negotiation algorithm (between users and locationbased service providers) is designed. The size of the obfuscation set is used to measure the location privacy in this approach. Notice that it is also possible that some approaches may belong to both anonymity and obfuscation categories, such as the approach [8] . There are also several other location privacy protection techniques not discussed here. For a complete survey of location privacy protection, please refer to Refs. [23, 24] . In this paper, we focus on designing cloaking area based approaches to address dynamic and diverse privacy requirements from mobile users. Notice that Gedik and Liu [25, 26] have studied personalized k-anonymity, which also supports personalized privacy requirements. However, they focused on spatio-temporal cloaking methods. In this paper, we assume a fixed unit time and do not consider temporal cloaking. In addition, our enhanced L2P2 has more restricted privacy requirements over both spatial and temporal domains than those in Refs. [25, 26] since enhanced L2P2 requests k-anonymity over a common set of mobile users over certain time period, not any mobile users.
L2P2 for Mobile LBS

Mobile LBS model
We assume a general model for location-based services (e.g., in Refs. [8, 9] ), where there are three critical components: mobile users, trusted location anonymization server, and location-based service providers. See Fig. 1 for illustration. In this model, a mobile user u i sends a location-based service request to the trusted anonymization server, which includes his location data .x; y/, timestamp information t, as well as his privacy requirement r (a number in k-anonymity models or a given region in entropybased models defined by the user). Hereafter, we use .u i ; x; y; t; r/ to represent such request. During this step, user authentication and message encryption can be performed to provide security protection. After the anonymization server gets the request message, it will perform location anonymization (generating a cloaking area c which covers the user's location .x; y/) to provide location privacy protection, then the anonymized location information (the cloaking area c) will be sent to the location-based service providers for the services. Our focus of this paper is how to perform location anonymization to fulfill location-aware privacy requirements at the location anonymization server. Notice that the location anonymization server (not necessary a centralized server but a group of distributed servers) has the location and timestamp information of all requests from all users, and it uses a footprint database F (each request will leave a footprint .u i ; x; y; t / in the database) to save all historical data. Here, we also assume that the temporal domain is divided into equal time intervals.
Similar to approaches in Refs. [8, 9] , we use a quadtree T [27] to partition the spatial domain recursively into cells. A cell at level l is partitioned into four smaller cells in level l C 1. The partitioning stops when the size of cells becomes less than a threshold. Assume that T has L levels. Figure 2a illustrates an example of such a quadtree. Let j -th cell at level l be c.j; l/ and its area be a.c.j; l// or a.j; l/. We assume that all generated cloaking areas by location anonymization server are cells in the quadtree T . In other words, for an LBS request at position .x; y/ which is contained at c.j; L/, all possible cloaking areas of this request are c.j; L/ and its ancestors in T , as shown in Fig. 2b . Obviously, smaller cells (at higher level) provide better quality of location data but with potentially smaller privacy values because less users may be involved. Notice that cells in the quadtree could be rectangles.
L2P2
The user privacy requirement r included in the LBS request is given by the user u i , and it could be dynamic and diverse over both spatial and temporal dimensions. In other words, it could be treated as a function of .u i ; x; y; t /. Thus, we call our model location-aware location privacy. As we discussed in Section 2, mainly there are two models to measure location privacy protection: k-anonymity model [8] and entropy-based model [9] . Definition 1 k-anonymity privacy (e.g., in Ref. Definition 2 Entropy-based privacy (e.g., in Ref. In both models, for each LBS request .u i ; x; y; t; r/, the goal of location privacy protection is to find a cloaking area c such that its privacy value (p k .c/ or p e .c/) is no less than r. Hereafter, we use p.c/ to represent the privacy value of either p k .c/ or p e .c/ for cloaking area c. If we only consider a user subset U 0 .c/ Â U.c/ instead of all users in U.c/, we can also define privacy value of c with respect to the subset U 0 accordingly, denoted as
Even though we use k-anonymity and entropy based metrics in our study, our proposed cloaking algorithms can adopt any privacy measurement to quantify the location privacy value. Recently, Shokri et al. [28, 29] showed that k-anonymity and entropy based metrics are not correlated with the attacker's success rate, thus may not be perfect metrics for location privacy. They also provide a new privacy measurement tool to quantify location privacy, which could be used by our proposed cloaking algorithms instead of k-anonymity and entropy based measurement.
Optimization problems for L2P2
While the single privacy request is easy to satisfy, the issue becomes more complicated when a user makes a sequence of requests in different locations with different privacy requirements. Now we are ready to formally define L2P2 problem. When a user requests a continuous LBS, it sends a sequence of LBS requests. The location anonymization server generates a sequence of cloaking areas to provide location privacy protection and sends them to the LBS provider. See  Fig. 3 for illustration. The generated cloaking area is required to satisfy the following conditions: (1) it contains the user's current location; (2) it should provide enough privacy protection as specified by the user; and (3) it would be as small as possible. We can define such a problem as follows.
Definition 3 Basic L2P2: Given a quadtree T , the footprint database F, and a sequence of LBS requests from user u in the format of .u; x i ; y i ; t i ; r i / for i D 1 to m, L2P2 techniques generate a sequence of cloaking areas c i D c.j i ; l i / (which are cells in T ) for i D 1 to m such that (1) each cloaking area c.j i ; l i / includes the user's location .x i ; y i / at t i ; (2) for any cloaking area c.j i ; l i /, its privacy value satisfies the corresponding privacy requirement, i.e., p.c.j i ; l i // r i ; (3) the total area of all cloaking areas
Notice that in basic L2P2, we assume that each user request r i (1 i m) is an independent event among the request sequence, so this basic L2P2 problem is easy to address. However, in some cases, simply satisfying basic L2P2 requirements is not enough for privacy protection. Note that an attacker may be able to shorten the list of possible users through discovering the common users in a sequence of cloaking areas. Therefore, similar to Ref. [9] , to prevent such attacks, we may want to consider an enhanced version of L2P2, where only the common users (in a sequence of cloaking areas) are considered for privacy value computation inside each cloaking area.
Definition 4 Enhanced L2P2: Given a quadtree T , the footprint database F, and a sequence of LBS requests from user u in the format of .u; x i ; y i ; t i ; r i / for i D 1 to m, enhanced L2P2 generates a sequence of cloaking areas c i D c.j i ; l i / (which are cells in T ) for i D 1 to m such that (1) each cloaking area c.j i ; l i / includes the user's location .x i ; y i / at t i ; (2) for any cloaking area c.j i ; l i /, its privacy value with respect to common user set U 0 satisfies user's requirement, i.e., p U 0 .c.j i ; l i // r i . Here U 0 is the set of common users among a sequence of cloaking areas, i.e., U 0 D \ 1 i m U.c.j i ; l i //; (3) the total area of all cloaking areas
Based on this definition, we can see that enhanced L2P2 must ensure that the privacy value of each cloaking area with respect to the common users is no less than the privacy requirement. This enhances the location privacy protection for mobile users, but makes the problem much more challenging. All existing cloaking algorithms (including Refs. [24, 25] ) do not work for the enhanced L2P2 problem, since the privacy values of the sequence of cloaking areas are not independent any more and moving one cloaking area will affect all others.
L2P2 Algorithms
In this section, we present five different cloaking algorithms to provide location-aware location privacy protection for a mobile user with a sequence of LBS requests. For simplicity, we present our algorithms in offline fashion (with the footprint repository and m LBS requests as their inputs), but all of them can be converted into online algorithms by using the techniques proposed in Ref. [9] . We start with a simple algorithm to address basic L2P2 problem, then four more heuristics are proposed for enhanced L2P2 problem.
Algorithm for basic L2P2
For the basic L2P2 problem, it is easy to find the optimal solution within polynomial time. Since each LBS request .u; x i ; y i ; t i ; r i / is an independent event in the request sequence, we can simply find the best cloaking area for each request separately. For request .u; x i ; y i ; t i ; r i /, we start at the leaf node in quadtree T where the cells are smallest cloaking areas. First, we find the leaf node which contains location of .x i ; y i / and use it as the initial cloaking area, then traverse the tree heading towards the root node (as shown in Fig. 3b ) until the privacy value of the current cloaking area fulfills the requirement from the user. This can guarantee that the generated cloaking area is the smallest one satisfying the privacy requirement. Algorithm 1 shows the detail. The time complexity of this algorithm is O.mL/.
Algorithms for enhanced L2P2
While the basic L2P2 is easy to solve, the enhanced L2P2 becomes more complicated. The major reason is that only the set of common users in a sequence of cloaking areas would be considered for computing privacy metrics. This can provide better location privacy protection for mobile users, however, it also makes the problem of L2P2 at location anonymization server much more challenging. In enhanced L2P2, whether a cloaking area for request r i can be satisfied is also dependent on the other requests in this sequence, since the privacy value of such a cloaking area is calculated with respect to the common users inside all cloaking areas generated from a request sequence. In such situation, moving the cloaking area along one branch of a quadtree for one request will affect the privacy values of cloaking areas at other branches for other requests. In other words, to increase the privacy value of a cloaking area c i of request r i , we can either expand the cloaking area of such request by moving it up toward the root node in the quadtree, or expand the cloaking areas of other requests, which may enlarge the common user set. Therefore, how to dynamically and efficiently generate the cloaking areas for a sequence of LBS requests is very challenging. The issues, such as what leaf nodes we should start and what stopping criteria we should have, require more thorough investigation. We certainly can try a brute force method, which examines all combinations and chooses an optimal one, but it will lead to the complexity of O.L m /. To simplify the computation, it is usually necessary to have some
Find the leaf node c.j i ; L/ in quadtree T which contains position of .x i ; y i /. while p.c i / < r i , i.e., the privacy value of c i does not fulfill the privacy requirement r i do
5:
Let c i be the parent node of current c i in T . In other words, move the cloaking area one level up in tree T towards the root. heuristics to reduce the complexity.
In this paper, we propose four different heuristics to generate cloaking areas for enhanced L2P2. We use Cloaking Algorithms 2 to 5 to denote them. These heuristics share one basic idea: they all start from initial cloaking areas at bottom of the quadtree T , and iteratively move cloaking areas up along T to increase the privacy values, until all cloaking areas fulfill the user requirements. One key difference among these four heuristics is the order of moving cloaking areas along the quadtree. The first two heuristics move cloaking areas in order while the latter two move cloaking areas greedily based on certain criteria. All algorithms have polynomial complexity of O.mL/.
The first algorithm (Algorithm 2) starts with the output of Algorithm 1, since cloaking areas satisfying the privacy requirements of enhanced L2P2 (with respect to common users) must first satisfy the privacy requirements for the corresponding basic L2P2. Then the algorithm first expands the cloaking area c 1 for the 1st request and checks whether the privacy values of all requests are fulfilled. If not, it continues moving the first cloaking area up until it reaches the root node. At this point, if the requirements are not met yet, it begins to move the cloaking area c 2 for the 2nd request. This process goes on until all requests are fulfilled. Note that all requests can always be fulfilled when all cloaking areas become the root node in the quadtree. Figure 4a illustrates this algorithm (Algorithm 2). Move c i to be its direct parent in T and l D l 1. Let i D 1. Move c i to be its direct parent in T . Pick the index i which maximizes POEi . If there is a tie, pick the one with smallest i .
10:
Move c i to be its direct parent in T . 
7:
POEi D and checks whether all requests are fulfilled. This process goes on until all requests are fulfilled. Figure 4b illustrates this procedure, and the detailed algorithm is given as Algorithm 3. This algorithm can guarantee that the level difference among all generated cloaking areas is within one in the quadtree T . The third and fourth algorithms (Algorithms 4 and 5) are greedy-based algorithms, where they choose one cloaking area (among all m cloaking areas) to expand in each step. The choice of cloaking areas is based on certain criteria/metrics (achieved privacy values or ratios between total privacy values and total cloaking areas, measured as POEi in Line 7 of Algorithm 4 or 5). See Fig. 4c for illustration. To be more specific, for Algorithm 4, we pick the cloaking area whose expansion can lead to maximum increase of privacy values. While in Algorithm 5, we consider both privacy and area increment, that is, we pick the cloaking area whose expansion can lead to the maximum increase of the ratio between total privacy values and total areas. If there is a tie, our algorithms pick the cloaking area of the earliest request.
In summary, the enhanced L2P2 problem is a very challenging problem. A simple brute force method can find the optimal solution, but have exponential time complexity, which makes it very time-consuming in practice especially when the number of LBS requests is large. We propose four different heuristics, which can find a sequence of cloaking areas in polynomial time to fulfill the user requirements. Each of these heuristics has a unique criterion to expand cloaking areas: either following certain order as in Algorithm 2 or 3, or based on privacy gain as in Algorithm 4 or 5. Figure 5 illustrates a running example for our proposed algorithms. In this example, three mobile users fu 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 g have footprints distributed in a square region which is divided into a 3-level quadtree as shown in Fig. 5a . Each colored triangle represents a footprint of a mobile user. Different colors represent different users. Five LBS requests are generated by user u 1 (i.e., .u 1 ; x i ; y i ; t i ; r i / for i D 1 to 5), which are represented by footprints with a surrounding circle. We assume that k-anonymity model is used and all r i D 2 (i.e., footprints of at least two (common) users are needed in the cloaking area). For each LBS request, there are three possible cloaking areas as shown in Fig. 5b . L2P2 algorithms aim to generate five cloaking areas (one for each LBS request) to fulfill the user's privacy requirements. Figure 5c shows the output of Algorithm 1. Since Algorithm 1 is only designed for the basic L2P2 problem where footprints of all users are considered, each of the smallest cloaking area has already footprints from two mobile users (including u 1 itself). Therefore, Algorithm 1 uses cloaking areas at Level 3 as the output and it is the optimal solution for the basic L2P2 problem. However, if we consider the enhanced L2P2 problem, this output cannot fulfill the privacy requirement since there is only one common user among all generated cloaking areas. 5 Example of L2P2 problems for a sequence of 5 requests from u 1 (footprints inside circles in (a) are the LBS requests from u 1 ). Here, we assume three mobile users fu 1 ; u 2 ; u 3 g with all privacy requirements r i D 2 under k-anonymity model.
Running example and discussions
In Algorithm 2, each cloaking area is expanded to the root of the quadtree before the next cloaking area begins to expand until the privacy requirements are fulfilled. Figure 5d shows the output. Clearly, when all of the first three cloaking areas are expanded (the first two at Level 1 and the third at Level 2), the common users are fu 1 ; u 3 g, which satisfies the requirement.
In Algorithm 3, cloaking areas are expanded in turn and the resulting cloaking areas are within one-level difference for sure. Figure 5e shows the output. When the first three cloaking areas are expanded to Level 2, the privacy requirements are fulfilled (with two common users fu 1 ; u 3 g already).
In Algorithm 4, in each step, the cloaking area whose expansion can lead to maximum total privacy values is chosen to expand. In this example, initially, expansion of any cloaking area will not increase the privacy values. Based on the tie-breaking rule, the first cloaking area is selected to expand. Such situation repeats until both cloaking areas of the first and second LBS requests are at Level 1, then the cloaking area of the third LBS request is selected to expand to Level 2 and the privacy requirements are fulfilled. The output and the order of expansions of Algorithm 4 are the same as those of Algorithm 2, as shown in Fig. 5d .
Algorithm 5 considers the ratio between total privacy values and total cloaking areas in each step when it greedily selects the cloaking area to expand. Since the area of cloaking areas at Level 2 is much smaller than the area of cloaking areas at Level 1, Algorithm 5 will pick a Level 2 cloaking area when the privacy values are the same. Therefore, the output of Algorithm 5 is the same as the one shown in Fig. 5e .
Via this simple running example, we can see that all proposed enhanced L2P2 algorithms can fulfill the privacy requirements. Algorithms 3 and 5 seem more efficient than Algorithms 2 and 4 in term of the final total/average area. However, all these algorithms may not lead to optimal solution for the enhanced L2P2 problem. Figure 5f shows the optimal solution for this running example, where the common users are fu 1 ; u 3 g, and only two of cloaking areas are at Level 2 while the others are at Level 3. On the other hand, the enhanced L2P2 problem is indeed very challenging, and the optimal solution is hard to find unless brute force methods are used.
Since our proposed methods cannot solve the enhanced L2P2 problem optimally, in the next section, we evaluate these methods using large synthetic and real-life location datasets of mobile users. Simulation confirms that all these methods can fulfill diverse privacy requirements, and two of them (Algorithms 3 and 5) can achieve this with just slight downgrade of the quality of original location data (using small cloaking areas).
Simulations
To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we tested our algorithms extensively through a series of simulations over two datasets (a synthetic dataset generated by a network-based traffic generator and a real-life GPS tracing dataset).
Simulations over synthetic data
To generate the synthetic coordinates of mobile users and their LBS requests, we use a network-based generator of moving objects proposed and implemented by Brinkhoff [10] . We randomly generate 1000 mobile users and simulate their movement on the real road map of Oldenberg, a city in Germany. For the moving speeds, we use the default setting in the generator, which changes users' speeds at each intersection based on the road type. We run the simulated 1000 mobile users for 1000 unit time, which generates about 3:5 10 4 footprints with timestamp and location information. Figure 6a shows the global and partial views of the map of Oldenberg with footprints of mobile users. All these footprints F are saved in MySQL (http://www.mysql.com/) as a footprint database. We implement all five proposed algorithms using Java as (a) (b) Fig. 6 (a) Footprints of 1000 mobile users in the real road map of Oldenberg, Germany, generated via the genertator [10] . (b) Footprints of 33 000 taxis over 3 months in the real-life T-Drive trajectory dataset [11, 12] over a road map of Beijing, China. A subset of 10 357 taxis over one day within a limited region (blue rectangle) is used in our simulations. the programming language.
We first build a 5-level quadtree T to divide the entire 16 km 16 km region of Oldenberg into different size of cloaking areas. The smallest cloaking area at the bottom of the tree T has a size of 1 km 1 km. We then randomly choose a mobile user and generate its privacy requirements. By applying the proposed algorithm, we generate a sequence of cloaking areas for this mobile user, and we verify (1) whether these cloaking areas can satisfy the user's privacy requirements and (2) how efficient these cloaking areas are in term of their average sizes. In other words, in this study, we are mainly interested in the following two performance metrics. One is cloaking area, i.e., the average area of generated cloaking areas, and the other is privacy protection level, i.e., the average privacy values achieved by generated cloaking areas. It is obvious that we prefer smaller cloaking area with larger privacy protection level. For all simulations, we perform multiple rounds over multiple users and report the average performance metrics. In addition, we test all methods under both onymity model [8] and entropy-based models [9] . Notice that due to the difference between these two models, we choose different mean values of privacy requirements in our simulations.
Performance on basic L2P2 In the first set of simulations, we consider the basic L2P2 problem and evaluate the performance of our basic algorithm (Algorithm 1) with different privacy requirements from the user. We fix the number of requests of each user at 20 and the privacy requirements are randomly chosen from a mean value from 5 to 10 for k-anonymity model and from 5 to 20 for entropy-based model. Figure 7 shows the detailed results. Here, we also run Algorithm 1 with all privacy requirements set to be the maximum value in the request sequence (denoted as Algorithm 1-Max or Alg 1-Max), which represents the previous work without considering diverse privacy requirements. From Figs. 7a and 7c, we find that Algorithm 1 uses much smaller cloaking areas than that of Algorithm 1-Max. This confirms our conjecture that considering the diverse privacy requirements can lead to better quality of LBS services. In addition, we also observe that the actual privacy protection levels from Algorithm 1 are also smaller than that of Algorithm 1-Max, as shown in Figs. 7b and 7d. (Obviously both methods satisfy the user's requirements because they are above the line of required privacy values). Based on these observations, it is desirable to have L2P2 solutions to efficiently protect mobile user's location privacy in 
LBS.
Performance on enhanced L2P2: Effect of privacy requirements In the second set of simulations, we focus on the enhanced L2P2 problem (where only common users are counted for privacy calculation) and evaluate the other four proposed methods (Algorithms 2, 3, 4, and 5), with the similar setting to the first set of simulations. From Figs. 8a and 8c , we find that all these algorithms need larger cloaking areas to protect the user privacy, compared with that of Algorithm 1. This is because only common users are counted for privacy calculation in Algorithms 2 to 5, while Algorithm 1 considers all users. In addition, Algorithms 3 and 5 use much smaller cloaking areas, compared with Algorithms 2 and 4. This tells us that Algorithms 3 and 5 are more efficient in term of the quality of cloaking areas generated. All methods need larger areas when users have higher privacy requirements. From Figs. 8b and 8d, it is clear that all methods can satisfy the privacy requirements over common user set, and the privacy protection level increases along with the increment of privacy requirements from users.
Performance on enhanced L2P2: Effect of request sequence length In the third set of simulations, we would like to see how different sequence length of LBS requests (i.e., different numbers of LBS requests) affect our results. We fix the privacy requirement with mean of 7 for k-anonymity model and 12 for entropybased model, then increase the number of LBS requests from 10 to 50 for both models. Figure 9 shows the results. From Figs. 9a and 9c , we observe that with the increase of LBS requests, Algorithms 3 and 5 consistently outperform Algorithms 2 and 4, in terms of average cloaking areas. However, in Figs. 9b and 9d , in term of average achieved privacy values, we do not see a clear trend here. We believe that this is because when more LBS requests are involved, the computation of common user sets is affected by more cloaking areas. Any user change in any cloaking area would impact the privacy value computation, which makes this issue more complicated.
Performance on enhanced L2P2: Comparison with optimal solutions In the last set of simulations, we compare solutions from all algorithms with the optimal solution obtained by a brute force method. Since the brute force method has exponential complexity, we use just 7 LBS requests in this set of simulations. Again, the privacy requirements are randomly chosen from a mean value from 5 to 9 for kanonymity model and from 12 to 25 for entropy-based model. Figure 10 illustrates the results. It is clear that the optimal solution outperforms all enhanced L2P2 algorithms (Algorithms 2 to 5), and the solutions of Algorithms 3 and 5 are very near the optimal solution while both algorithms have polynomial complexity, which is much more efficient than the brute force method. Notice that the enhanced L2P2 problem is much stronger than the basic one, thus may cause larger cloaking areas. Therefore, we suggest that the user should not use large m or high r in their system. Here, we use large m in simulations to illustrate the power of enhanced L2P2 over basic L2P2.
Simulations over real-life tracing data
We also test our proposed algorithms over a real-world trajectory dataset provided in Refs. [11, 12] : T-Drive taxi trajectory dataset. This dataset was generated by over 33 000 taxis in a period of 3 months in Beijing, China. Figure 6b shows a plot of all footprints over the map of Beijing. We use a sample dataset from T-Drive dataset that contains one-week trajectories of 10 357 taxis for our simulations and treat each taxi as a mobile user. The total number of footprints in this dataset is about 15 million. The average interval between two footprints is 3:1 minutes and the average distance between them is 600 meters. To reduce the number of footprints, we only use the footprints of one particular day (February 4, 2008) and limit the region to a rectangle as shown in Fig. 6b (i. e., all footprints have their latitudes within OE116:35 ı ; 116:45 ı and longitudes within OE39:90 ı ; 39:95 ı ). The area of this entire region is around 8:52 km 6:56 km, and it covers the center city of Beijing. We build a 6-level quadtree T to divide the selected region into different sizes of cloaking areas. The smallest cloaking area has a size of 0:27 km 0:21 km roughly.
Again, we randomly choose multiple mobile users and generate their privacy requirements. We fix the number of requests of each user at 20 and the privacy requirements are randomly chosen from a mean value from 2 to 7 for k-anonymity model and from 3 to 7 for entropy-based model. Figure 11 shows the simulation results of Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 1-Max over the basic L2P2 problem. It is clear that by considering diverse privacy requirements Algorithm 1 can lead to smaller cloaking area while satisfying the user's privacy requirement. Figure 12 shows the simulation results of Algorithms 2-5 over the enhanced L2P2 problem. Again, all conclusions are consistent with those in simulations with synthetic dataset. All proposed algorithms can satisfy the privacy requirements over common users. Algorithms 3 and 5 are much more efficient (in term of the average area of the cloaking areas) than Algorithms 2 and 4. This is more obvious than in simulations with synthetic dataset, since more levels in the quadtree are used in this set of simulations. This also makes the difference between Algorithms 3 and 5 hardly seen in Figs. 12a and 12c . In summary, the proposed algorithms (especially Algorithms 3 and 5) can indeed fulfill diverse privacy requirements with slight downgrade of the quality of original location data.
Conclusion
With the increasing importance of user location privacy issues, many approaches have been proposed to protect mobile users' location information. However, we observe that these existing approaches usually assume that users' privacy requirements are constant, which may not always be true in real-life scenarios. In this paper, observing that a mobile user's privacy requirements can be dynamic and diverse, we formalize this as the L2P2 problem. We further classify L2P2 problems into basic L2P2 and enhanced L2P2 problems. The difference between basic and enhanced L2P2 lies in whether the common users or all users in a sequence of cloaking areas would be used for privacy computation. For basic L2P2, a simple algorithm (Algorithm 1) can easily solve the problem. While for enhanced L2P2, we propose four heuristics (Algorithms 2 to 5) to generate cloaking areas to satisfy users' privacy requirements, where each heuristic has a different, unique criterion to expand cloaking areas. To evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed algorithms, we preform extensive simulations over both synthetic and real-life datasets, and several interesting observations have been reported.
There are a few directions we will investigate in our future work. First, for enhanced L2P2 problem, in this paper we only propose four heuristics to address it, and performances of these four heuristics are very different. We will propose and investigate other heuristics in our future work. Second, we will test our proposed methods over other location data sets and try different location privacy measurements (beyond privacy requirement and total area of cloaking areas, such as those used in Refs. [28, 29] ) or different location query models (such as those considered in Ref. [30] ). Third, here we do not study how the proposed methods perform under different localizations or tracking attacks. More formal investigation on threat models and evaluations will be preformed in our future work. Last, we are also interested in investigating other types of location-based privacy, such as considering the content of actual query which is beyond just the location.
